No Place to Hide: Catching Fraudulent Entities in Tensors by Ban, Yikun et al.
No Place to Hide: Catching Fraudulent Entities in Tensors
Yikun Ban∗
Peking University
banyikun@pku.edu.cn
Xin Liu
Tsinghua University
liuxin16@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Yitao Duan
Fintec.ai
duan@fintec.ai
Xue Liu
McGill University
xueliu@cs.mcgill.ca
Wei Xu
Tsinghua University
weixu@tsinghua.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Many approaches focus on detecting dense blocks in the tensor
of multimodal data to prevent fraudulent entities (e.g., accounts,
links) from retweet boosting, hashtag hijacking, link advertising,
etc. However, no existing method is effective to find the dense block
if it only possesses high density on a subset of all dimensions in
tensors. In this paper, we novelly identify dense-block detection
with dense-subgraph mining, by modeling a tensor into a weighted
graph without any density information lost. Based on the weighted
graph, which we call information sharing graph (ISG), we propose
an algorithm for finding multiple densest subgraphs, D-Spot, that
is faster (up to 11x faster than the state-of-the-art algorithm) and
can be computed in parallel. In an N-dimensional tensor, the entity
group found by the ISG+D-Spot is at least 1/2 of the optimum
with respect to density, compared with the 1/N guarantee ensured
by competing methods. We use nine datasets to demonstrate that
ISG+D-Spot becomes new state-of-the-art dense-block detection
method in terms of accuracy specifically for fraud detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fraud represents a serious threat to the integrity of social or review
networks such as Twitter and Amazon, with people introducing
fraudulent entities (e.g., fake accounts, reviews, etc.) to gain more
publicity/profit over a brief period. For example, on a social net-
work or media sharing website, people may wish to enhance their
account’s popularity by illegally buying more followers [27]; on
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e-commerce websites, fraudsters may register multiple accounts to
benefit from “new user” promotions.
Consider the typical log data generated from a social review site
(e.g., Amazon), which contains four-dimensional features: users,
products, timestamps, rating scores. These data are often formulated
as a tensor, in which each dimension denotes a separate feature and
an entry (tuple) of the tensor represents a review action. Based on
previous studies [12, 30], fraudulent entities form dense blocks (sub-
tensors) within the main tensor, such as when a mass of fraudulent
user accounts create an enormous number of fake reviews for a
set of products over a short period. Dense-block detection has
also been applied to network intrusion detection [20, 30], retweet
boosting detection [12], bot activities detection [30], and genetics
applications [20, 26].
Various dense-block detection methods have been developed.
One approach uses tensor decomposition, such as CP decomposition
and higher-order singular value decomposition [20]. However, as
observed in [32], such methods are outperformed by search-based
techniques [12, 30, 32] in terms of accuracy, speed, and flexibility re-
garding support for different density metrics. Furthermore, [30, 32]
provide an approximation guarantee for finding the densest/optimal
block in a tensor.
We have examined the limitations of search-based methods for
dense-block detection. First, these methods are incapable of detect-
ing hidden-densest blocks. We define a hidden-densest block as one
that does not have a high-density signal on all dimensions of a ten-
sor, but evidently has a high density on a subset of all dimensions.
Moreover, existing methods neglect the data type and distribution
of each dimension on the tensor. Assuming that two dense blocks A
and B have the same density, however, A is the densest on a subset
of critical features, such as IP address and device ID, whereas B is
the densest on some trivial features such as age and gender. Can
we simply believe that A is as suspicious as B? Unfortunately, the
answer when using existing methods is ‘yes.’
To address these limitations, we propose a dense-block detection
framework and focus on entities that form dense blocks on tensors.
The proposed framework is designed using a novel approach. Given
a tensor, the formation of dense blocks is the result of value sharing
(the behavior whereby two or more different entries share a distinct
value (entity) in the tensor). Based on this key point, we propose a
novel Information Sharing Graph (ISG)model, which accurately cap-
tures each instance of value sharing. The transformation from dense
blocks in a tensor to dense subgraphs in ISG leads us to propose a
fast, high-accuracy algorithm, D-Spot, for determining fraudulent
entities with a provable guarantee regarding the densities of the
detected subgraphs.
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In summary, the main contributions of this study are as follows:
1) [Graph Model]. We propose the novel ISG model, which
converts every value sharing in a tensor to the representation of
weighted edges or nodes (entities). Furthermore, our graph model
considers diverse data types and their corresponding distributions
based on information theory to automatically prioritize multiple
features.
2) [Algorithm].We propose the D-Spot algorithm, which is able
to find multiple densest subgraphs in one run. And we theoretically
prove that the multiple subgraphs found by D-Spot must contain
some subgraphs that are at least 1/2 as dense as the optimum. In real-
world graphs, D-Spot is up to 11× faster than the state-of-the-art
competing algorithm.
3) [Effectiveness]. In addition to dense blocks, ISG+D-Spot also
effectively differentiates hidden-densest blocks from normal ones.
In experiments using eight public real-world datasets, ISG+D-Spot
detected fraudulent entities more accurately than conventional
methods.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Economics of Fraudsters
As most fraudulent schemes are designed for financial gain, it is
essential to understand the economics behind the fraud. Only when
the benefits to a fraudster outweigh their costs will they perform a
scam.
To maximize profits, fraudsters have to share/multiplex different
resources (e.g., fake accounts, IP addresses, and device IDs) over
multiple frauds. For example, [13] found that many users are associ-
ated with a particular group of followers on Twitter; [36] identified
that many cases of phone number reuse; [4] observed that the IP
addresses of many spam proxies and scam hosts fall into a few
uniform ranges; and [38] revealed that fake accounts often conduct
fraudulent activities over a short time period.
Thus, fraudulent activities often form dense blocks in a tensor
(as described below) because of this resource sharing.
2.2 Related Work
Search-based dense-block detection in tensors. Previous stud-
ies [12, 20, 30] have shown the benefit of incorporating features
such as timestamps and IP addresses, which are often formulated
as a multi-dimensional tensor. Mining dense blocks with the aim of
maximizing a density metric on tensors is a successful approach.
CrossSpot [12] randomly chooses a seed block and then greedily
adjusts it in each dimension until the local optimum is attained.
This technique usually requires enormous seed blocks and does
not provide any approximation guarantee for finding the global
optimum. In contrast to adding feature values to seed blocks, M-
Zoom [30] removes feature values from the initial tensor one by one
using a similar greedy strategy, providing a 1/N -approximation
guarantee for finding the optimum (where N is the number of di-
mensions in the tensor). M-Biz [31] also starts from a seed block
and then greedily adds or removes feature values until the block
reaches a local optimum. Unlike M-Zoom, D-Cube [32] deletes a set
of feature values on each step to reduce the number of iterations,
and is implemented in a distributed disk-based manner. D-Cube
provides the same approximation guarantee as M-Zoom.
Table 1: ISG+D-Spot vs. existing dense-block detectionmeth-
ods.
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√ √ √ √ √ √
Catch densest blocks?
√ √ √ √ √ √
Catch hidden-densest blocks? × × × × × √
%-Approximation Guarantee? × × 1/N × 1/N 1/2
Tensor decomposition methods. Tensor decomposition [17] is
often applied to detect dense blocks within tensors [20]. Scalable
algorithms, such as those described in [23, 33, 37], have been devel-
oped for tensor decomposition. However, as observed in [12, 32],
these methods are limited regarding the detection of dense blocks,
and usually detect blocks with significantly lower densities, provide
less flexibility with regard to the choice of density metric, and do
not provide any approximation guarantee.
Dense-subgraph detection.A graph can be represented by a two-
dimensional tensor, where an edge corresponds to a non-zero entry
in the tensor. The mining of dense subgraphs has been extensively
studied [18]. Detecting the densest subgraph is often formulated as
finding the subgraph with the maximum average degree, and may
use exact algorithms [10, 16] or approximate algorithms [6, 16].
Fraudar [11] is an extended approximate algorithm that can be
applied to fraud detection in social or review graphs. CoreScope [29]
tends to find dense subgraphs in which all nodes have a degree of at
least k . Implicitly, singular value decomposition (SVD) also focuses
on dense regions in matrixes. EigenSpoke [24] reads scatter plots of
pairs of singular vectors to find patterns and chip communities, [7]
extracts dense subgraphs using a spectral cluster framework, and
[14, 27] use the top eigenvectors from SVD to identify abnormal
users.
Other anomaly/fraud detectionmethodsThe use of belief prop-
agation [3, 22] and HITS-like ideas [8, 9, 13] is intended to catch rare
behavior patterns in graphs. Belief propagation has been used to
assign labels to the nodes in a network representation of a Markov
random field [3]. When adequate labeled data are available, classi-
fiers can be constructed based on multi-kernel learning [2], support
vector machines [35], and k-nearest neighbor [34] approaches.
3 DEFINITIONS AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we introduce the notations and definitions used
throughout the paper, analyze the limitations of existing approaches,
and describe our key motivations.
3.1 Notation and Formulations
Table 2 lists the notations used in this paper.We use [N ] = {1, ...,N }
for brevity. LetR(A1, ...,AN ,X ) = {t0, ..., t |X |} be a relationwithN -
dimensional features, denoted by {A1, ...,AN }, and a dimensional
entry identifiers, denoted by X . For each entry (tuple) t ∈ R, t =
(a1, ...,aN ,x), where ∀n ∈ [N ], we use t[An ] to denote the value
of An in t , t[An ] = an and t[X ] to denote the identification of t ,
t[X ] = x , x ∈ X . We define the mass of R as |R|, which is the total
number of such entries, |R| = |X |. For each n ∈ [N ], we use Rn to
Table 2: Symbols and Definitions
Symbol Interpretation
N number of dimensions in a tensor
[N ] set {1,..., N}
R(A1, ..., AN , X ) relation representing a tensor
An n-th dimensional values of R
Rn set of distinct values of An of R
t = (a1, ..., aN , x ) an entry (tuple) of R
B(A1, ..., AN , X) a block in R
Bn set of distinct values of An of B
U target dimension in R
V = {u1, ..., u } set of distinct values ofU
G = (V, E) Information Sharing Graph
Si, j S-score between ui and uj
Si S -score of ui
G = (V, E) subgraph in G
F density metric
denote the set of distinct values ofAn . Thus, R naturally represents
an N -dimensional tensor of size |R1 | × ... × |RN |.
A block B in R is defined as B(A1, ...,AN ,X) = {t ∈ R :
t[X ] ∈ X} and X ⊆ X . Additionally, the mass |B| is the number
of entries of B and Bn is the set of distinct values of An . Let
B(a,An ) = {t ∈ R : t[An ] = a} represent all entries that take the
value a on An . The mass |B(a,An )| is the number of such entries.
A simple example is given as follows.
Example 1 (Amazon review logs).Assume a relationR(user ,product ,
timestamp,X ), where ∀t ∈ R, t = (a1,a2,a3,x) indicates a review
action where user a1 reviews product a2 at timestamp a3, and the
identification of the action is x . Because a1 may review a2 at a3
(we assume that a3 represents a period) multiple times, X helps us
distinguish each such action. The mass of R, denoted by |R|, is the
number of all review actions in the dataset. The number of distinct
users in R is |R1 |. A block B(a1,user ) is the set of all rating entries
operated by user a1, and the number of overall entries of B(a1,user )
is |B(a1,user )|.
First, we present a density metric that is known to be useful for
fraud detection [30, 32]:
Definition 1. (Arithmetic Average Mass ρ). Given a block
B(A1, ...,AN ,X), the arithmetic average mass ofB on dimensions
N is
ρ(B,N) = |B|1
|N |
∑
n∈N |Bn |
,
where N is a subset of [N ] and obviously ρ ∈ [1.0,+∞).
If block B is dense in R, then ρ(B, [N ]) > 1.0.
Other density metrics listed in [32] are also effective for fraud
detection. It is broadly true that all density measures are functions
of the cardinalities of the dimensions and masses of B and R. In R,
previous studies [12, 30–32] have focused on detecting the top-k
densest blocks in terms of a density metric. In the remainder of this
paper, we use the density metric ρ to illustrate our key points.
3.2 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches and
Motivation
In practice, the blocks formed by fraudulent entities in R may be
described by hidden-densest blocks. To illustrate hidden-densest
blocks, we present the following definitions and examples.
user 1 product 1 date 1 IP 1 …
user 2 product 1 date 1 IP 2
…
Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4
Entry 1
Entry 2
Entry 3
(a) Relation R
…
…
Optimal
D-Spot
D-Spot
D-Spot
(b) ISG (c) Fraudulent Entities
Target Dimension
Figure 1: Workflow of ISG+D-Spot.
Definition 2. In R(A1, ...,AN , X ), we say that B(A1, ...,AN ,X)
is the densest on a dimension An if ρ(B, {n}) is the maximal value
of all possible ρ(Bˆ, {n}), where Bˆ is any possible block in R.
Definition 3. (Hidden-Densest Block). InR(A1, ...,AN ,X ),B(A1, ...,
AN ,X) is the hidden-densest block if B is the densest on a small
subset of {A1, ...,AN }.
Example 2 (Registration logs). In a registration dataset with 19
features, fake accounts only exhibit conspicuous resource sharing with
respect to the IP address feature.
Example 3 (TCP dumps). The DARPA dataset [1] has 43 features,
but the block formed by malicious connections is only the densest on
two features.
Thus, catching hidden-densest blocks has a significant utility
in the real world. Unfortunately, the problem is intractable using
existing approaches [12, 30–32].
First, assuming that the hidden-densest block B(A1, ...,AN ,X)
is only the densest on dimension AN , we have that
ρ(B, [N−1]) = |B|1
N−1
∑
n∈[N−1] |Bn |
≈ ρ(B, [N ]) = |B|1
N
∑
n∈[N ] |Bn |
when N is sufficiently large. Assuming ρ(B, [N − 1]) is very low,
then the methods in [12, 30–32], which try to find the block B that
maximizes ρ(B, [N ]), have a limited ability to detect the hidden-
densest block.
Second, consider a block B formed by fraudulent entities, in
whichB is only the densest on {A2,A3,A5}, and thus ρ(B, {2, 3, 5})
is maximal. However, the techniques of [12, 30–32] cannot find
{A2,A3,A5} when the feature combinations are exploded.
Furthermore, in R(A1, ...,AN , X ), consider two blocks B1 and
B2, where B1 is the densest on Ai , B2 is the densest on Aj , and
ρ(B1, [N ]) = ρ(B2, [N ]). Does this indicate that B1 and B2 are
equally suspicious? No, absolutely not, because Ai could be the IP
address feature and Aj could be a trivial feature such as the user’s
age, location, or gender.
[Value Sharing]. Based on the considerations above, we design
our approach from a different angle. The key reason behind the for-
mation of dense blocks is value sharing. Given t1 ∈ R, a dimension
An , and t1[An ] = a, we can identify value sharing when ∃t2 ∈ R,
t2 , t1, and t2[An ] = a.
Obviously, if a block B is dense, ρ(B, [N ]) > 1.0, then value
sharing must be occurring, i.e., value sharing results in dense
blocks.
Therefore, detecting dense blocks is equivalent to catching value
sharing signals. We propose ISG based on information theory and
design the D-Spot algorithm to leverage graph features, allowing
us to catch fraudulent entities within dense blocks and overcome
the limitations mentioned above.
4 ISG BUILDING
In this section, we present the Information Sharing Graph (ISG),
which is constructed on the relation R.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Catching fraudulent entities is equivalent to detecting a subset
of distinct values in a certain dimension. Let U denote the target
dimension in which a subset of distinct values form the fraudulent
entities we wish to detect. In R = (A1, ...,AN ,X ), we choose a
dimension and set it asU , and denote the remaining (N − 1)
dimensions as K dimensions, k ∈ [K], for brevity. We build the
ISG of U , i.e., the weighted-undirected graph G = (V,E), in which
V = {u1, ...,un } is the set of distinct values ofU .
In Example 1, R(user ,product , timestamp,X ), we set U = user
if we wish to detect fraudulent user accounts. In Example 2, we set
U = account if we would like to identify fake accounts. In Example
3, we setU = connection to catch malicious connections.
To specifically describe the process of value sharing, we present
the two following definitions:
Definition 4. (Pairwise Value Sharing). Given ui ,uj ∈ V and
a ∈ Ak , we say that ui and uj share value a on Ak if ∃t1, t2 ∈ R
such that t1[U ] = ui , t2[U ] = uj and t1[Ak ] = t2[Ak ] = a.
Pairwise value sharing occurs when a distinct value is shared by
multiple individual entities. Given a value sharing process in which
a is shared byV ⊂ V, we denote this as |V |( |V |−1)2 pairwise value
sharing.
Definition 5. (Self-Value Sharing). Given t1 ∈ R, where t1[U ] =
ui , ui ∈ V, and t1[Ak ] = a, we say that ui shares value a on Ak if
∃t2 ∈ R and t2 , t1 such that t2[U ] = ui and t2[Ak ] = a.
Another type of value sharing occurs when the distinct value a
is shared n times by an entity ui , which can be represented by n
instances of self-value sharing.
In ISG G = (V,E), for some edge (ui ,uj ) ∈ E, Si, j represents the
information between ui and uj derived from the other K dimen-
sions, and for some node ui ∈ V, Si denotes the information of ui
calculated from the other K dimensions. From the definitions and
notations defined in the previous section, Problem 1 gives a formal
definition of how to build the ISG of a tensor.
Problem 1 (Building a pairwise information graph). (1) Input:
a relation R, the target dimension U , (2) Output: the information
sharing graph G = (V,E).
4.2 Building an ISG
Given a dimension Ak , the target dimensionU , any ui ∈ V, and an
entry t1 ∈ R for which t1[U ] = ui , then for each a ∈ Ak , we assume
that the probability of t1[Ak ] = a is pk (a).
Edge Construction. Based on information theory [28], the self-
information of the event that ui and uj share a is:
Iki, j (a) = log(
1
pk (a) )
2. (1)
To compute the pairwise value sharing between ui and uj across all
K dimensions, we propose the metric S-score as the edge weight
of ISG:
Si, j =
K∑
k=1
∑
a∈Hk (ui ,uj )
Iki, j (a), (2)
where Hk (ui ,uj ) is the set of all values shared by ui and uj on Ak .
Note that Si, j = 0.0 if⋃Kk=1 Hk (ui ,uj ) = ∅.
Intuitively, if ui and uj do not have any shared values, which is
to be expected in normal circumstances, we have zero information.
Otherwise, we obtain some information. Thus, the higher the value
of Si, j is, the more similar ui is to uj . In practice, the S-score has a
large variance. For example, fraud user pairs sharing an IP subnet
and device ID will have a high S-score, whereas normal users are
unlikely to share these values with anyone, and will thus have an
S-score close to zero. Additionally, the information we obtain for
ui and uj sharing the value a is related to the overall probability of
that value. For example, it would be much less surprising if they
both follow Donald Trump on Twitter than if they both follow a
relatively unknown user.
Node Setting. For a node ui ∈ V, let B(a,Ak ,ui ,U ) be the set
{t ∈ R : (t[Ak ] = a) ∧ (t[U ] = ui )}. When |B(a,Ak ,ui ,U )| ≥ 2.
The information of forming B(a,Ak ,ui ,U ) is:
Iki (a) = log(
1
pk (a) )
|B(a,Ak ,ui ,U ) | . (3)
We now define Si to compute the self-value sharing forui across
all K dimensions:
Si =
K∑
k=1
∑
B∈Hk (ui )
Iki (a), (4)
whereHk (ui ) is the set {B(a,Ak ,ui ,U ),∀a ∈ Rk } and Rk is the set
of distinct values of Ak . Note that Si = 0.0 if
⋃K
k=1 Hk (ui ) = ∅.
In effect, self-value sharing occurs in certain fraud cases. For
instance, a fraudulent user may create several fake reviews for a
product/restaurant on Amazon/Yelp [25] over a few days. In terms
of network attacks [19], a malicious TCP connection tends to attack
a server multiple times.
Determining [ pk (a) ]. We can extend the S-score to accommo-
date different data types and distributions.
It is difficult to determine pk (a), as we do not always know the
distribution of Ak . In this case, for dimensions that are attribute
features, we assume a uniform distribution and simply set
pk (a) = 1/|Rk |. (5)
This approximation works well for many fraud-related properties
such as IP subnets and device IDs, which usually follow a Poisson
distribution [12].
However, the uniform assumption works poorly for low-entropy
distributions, such as the long-tail distribution, which is common in
dimensions such as items purchased or users followed. Low entropy
implies that many users behave similarly anyway, independent of
frauds. Intuitively for such distributions, there is no surprise in
following a celebrity (head of the distribution), but considerable
information if they both follow someone at the tail. For example,
20% of users correspond to more than 80% of the “follows” in online
social networks. The dense subgraphs between celebrities and their
fans are very unlikely to be fraudulent. If feature Ak has a long-tail
distribution, its entropy is very low. For example, the entropy of
the uniform distribution over 50 values is 3.91, but the entropy of a
long-tail distribution with 90% of probabilities centered around one
value is only 0.71. Therefore, we set pk (a) based on the empirical
distribution as
pk (a) = |B(a,Ak )|/|R|, (6)
when the values in Ak have low entropy. We also provide an inter-
face so that users can define their own pk (a) function.
Optimization of ISG Construction. In theory, a graph with |V|
nodes has O(|V|2) edges. Naively, therefore, it takes O(|V|2) time
for graph initialization and traversal.
To reduce the complexity of building the ISG, we use the key-
value approach. The key corresponds to a value a on Ak and the
value represents the block B(a,Ak ). LetV ⊆ V denote the entities
that occur in B(a,Ak ). As each pair (ui ,uj ) ∈ V shares a, we
increase the value of Si, j by Iki, j (a). Additionally, for each ui ∈ V ,
there exists some B(a,Ak ,ui ,U ) ⊆ B(a,Ak ). Thus, we increase the
value of Si by Iki (a) if |B(a,Ak ,ui ,U )| ≥ 2.
To build the ISG, we compute all key-value pairs across K dimen-
sions by traversing R in parallel. Thus, it takes O(K |R| + |E|) time
to build the graph G = (V,E). Note that we only retain positive
Si, j and Si . In practice, G is usually sparse, which is discussed in
Section 6.1.
4.3 Key Observations on ISG
Given a relation R = (A1, ...,AN ,X ) in which we set U = AN , we
construct the ISG ofU ,G = (V,E). Assuming there is a fraudulent
block B in R, B = (A1, ...,AN ,X) is transformed into a subgraph
G = (V, E) in G, where V is the set of distinct values of AN
and an edge Si, j ∈ E denotes the information between ui and uj
calculated from the otherK dimensions. Then,V is the fraud group
comprised of fraudulent entities that we wish to detect.
We summarize three critical observations of G that directly lead
to the algorithms presented in Section 5.2. Given G = (V, E), we
define the edge density of G as
ρedдe (G) =
|E |
|V|(|V| − 1)
1) The value of Si, j or Si is unusually high. Value sharing
may happen frequently, but sharing across certain features, even
certain values, is more suspicious than others. Intuitively, it might
be suspicious if two users share an IP address or follow the same
random “nobody” on Twitter. However, it is not so suspicious if they
have a common gender, city, or follow the same celebrity. In other
words, certain value sharing is likely to be fraudulent because the
probability of sharing across a particular dimension, or at a certain
value, is quite low. Thus, the information value is high, which is
accurately captured by Si, j and Si .
2) |V| is usually large. Fraudsters perform the same actions
many times to achieve economies of scale. Thus, we expect to
find multiple pairwise complicities among fraudulent accounts. A
number of studies have found that large cluster sizes are a crucial
indicator of fraud [5, 38]. Intuitively, while it is natural for a few
family members to share an IP address, it is highly suspicious when
dozens of users share one.
3) The closer ρedдe (G) is to 1.0, the more suspicious G is.
Fraudsters usually operate a number of accounts for the same job,
and thus it is likely that users manipulated by the same fraudster
will share the same set of values. Thus, the G formed by the fraud
group will be well-connected.
Appearance of legitimate entities on ISG. In G = (V,E), given
some ui that we assume to be legitimate, let h(ui ) denote the
set of its neighbor nodes. We have two findings. (1) For ui , Si +∑
uj ∈V Si, j → 0 because ui is unlikely to share values with others.
Even if exists, the shared values should have a high probability
(see observation 1) and therefore small Si, j . (2) The subgraph G
induced byh(ui ) is typically not well-connected, as resource sharing
is uncommon in the real world. If G is well-connected, |h(ui )| is
quite small compared with the fraud group size (see observation 2).
In summary, the techniques described in [12, 20, 30–32] work
directly on the tensor, indicating that they consider value sharing on
each dimension, and even certain values, as equivalent. In contrast,
ISG assigns each instance of value sharing a theoretical weight
based on the edges and nodes of the ISG, which is more effective
for identifying the (hidden-) densest blocks (comparison in Sec.6.2).
5 SPOTTING FRAUD
Based on the observations in Section 4.3, we now describe our
method for finding objective subgraphs inG. This section is divided
into two parts: first, we define a density metric FG , and then we
illustrate the proposed D-Spot algorithm.
5.1 Density Metric and Problem Definition
To find the objective G = (V, E), we define a density metric FG as
[6, 11]:
FG =
∑
(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j +
∑
ui ∈V Si
|V| . (7)
The form of FG satisfies the three key observations of G in Section
4.3.
(1) Keeping |V | fixed, we have that∑(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j+∑ui ∈V Si ↑⇒
FG ↑.
(2) Keeping Si, j , Si , and ρedдe (G) fixed, we have that |V | ↑⇒
FG ↑.
(3) Keeping Si, j , Si , and |V| fixed, we have that ρedдe (G) ↑⇒
FG ↑.
Thus, our subgraph-detection problem can be defined as follows:
Problem2 (Detecting dense subgraphs). (1) Input: the information
sharing graph G = (V,E). (2) Find: multiple subgraphs of G that
maximize F .
5.2 D-Spot (Algorithm 1-3)
In real-world datasets, there are usually numerous fraud groups
forming multiple dense subgraphs. Based on the considerations
described above, we propose D-Spot (Algorithms 1–3). Compared
with other well-known algorithms for finding the densest sub-
graph [6, 11], D-Spot has two differences:
(1) D-Spot can detect multiple densest subgraphs simultane-
ously. D-Spot first partitions the graph, and then detects a
single densest subgraph in each partition.
(2) D-Spot is faster. First, instead of removing nodes one by one,
D-Spot removes a set of nodes at once, reducing the number
of iterations. Second, it detects the single densest subgraph in
partition G = (V, E), rather than in graphG = (V,E), where
|V| << |V| and |E | << |E|.
D-Spot consists of two main steps: (1) Given G, divide G into
multiple partitions (Algorithm 1); (2) In each G, find a single dense
subgraph (Algorithms 2 and 3).
Algorithm 1: graph partitioning. Let Gˆ be a dense subgraph
formed by a fraud group that we are about to detect. In G, there
are usually multiple Gˆs, where each Gˆ should be independent or
connected with others by small values ofSi, j . Thus we let Gs be the
connected components of G as partitions (line 6). For each G ∈ Gs ,
we run Algorithms 2 and 3 (lines 7–9) to find Gˆ. Finally, Algorithm
1 returns multiple dense subgraphs Gˆs (line 10). Note that there is
a guarantee that Gˆs must contain the Gˆ that is at least 1/2 of the
optimum of G in terms of F (proof in Sec.6.3).
Information pruning (recommended). As mentioned before,
Fraud entities usually have surprising similarities that are quanti-
fied by Si, j . We want to delete edges with regular weights and thus
we provide a threshold for removing edges:
θ =
∑
(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j
|V|(|V| − 1) (8)
It is easy to see that θ (conservative) is the average information of
all possible pairs (ui ,uj ). Thus, we iterate through all edges in G,
and remove those for which Si, j < θ (lines 3–5). In all experiments
of this paper, we used θ and get the expected conclusion that the
performance of D-Spot using θ is hardly different from no pruning
but using θ is able to significantly decrease the running cost of
D-Spot.
Algorithm 1 find multiple dense subgraphs in G
Require: G = (V,E), θ (Eq.8 ),w() (Eq. 9)
Ensure: Gˆs
1: Gˆs← ∅
2: if needed then
3: for each Si, j ∈ E do
4: if Si, j < θ then
5: remove Si, j
6: Gs← connected components of G
7: for each G ∈ Gs do
8: Gˆ ← find a dense subgraph (G,w())
9: Gˆs← Gˆs ∪{Gˆ}
10: return Gˆs
Algorithms 2 and 3: find a dense subgraph. Initially, letVc be
a copy ofV . In each iteration (lines 5–14), we delete a set of nodes
(R, line 6) from Vc until Vc is empty. Of all the Vc constructed
during the execution of the algorithm, that maximizing F (Rˆ, line
15) is returned as the output of the algorithm.
Given a subgraph G = (V, E), for some ui ∈ V , we define
w(ui ,G) as
w(ui ,G) =
∑
(uj ∈V)∧((ui ,uj )∈E)
Si, j + Si . (9)
Lines 1–4 initialize the parameters used in the algorithm. Dict2
records thew value of each node. Dict1 records the order in which
Algorithm 2 find a dense subgraph
Require: G = (V, E),w()(Eq. 9)
Ensure: Gˆ
1: Vc ← copy(V)
2: Ssum ← ∑(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j +∑ui ∈V Si
3: ∀u ∈ V,Dict1[u] ← 0,Dict2[u] = w(u,G)
4: index ← 0, Fmax ← Ssum|Vc | , top ← 0
5: whileVc , ∅ do
6: R ← {u ∈ Vc : Dict2[u] ≤
2
∑
(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j+
∑
ui ∈Vc Si
|Vc | } (Eq.
10)
7: sort R in increasing order of Dict2[u]
8: for each u ∈ R do
9: Vc ←Vc − u, Ssum ← Ssum − Dict2[u]
10: index ← index + 1, Dict1[u] ← index
11: F = Ssum|Vc |
12: if F > Fmax then
13: Fmax ← F , top ← index
14: Dict2← update edges (u,Vc ,Dict2,G)
15: Rˆ ← {u ∈ V : Dict1[u] > top}
16: return Gˆ (the subgraph induced by Rˆ)
Algorithm 3 update edges
Require: ui ,Vc , Dict2, G = (V, E)
Ensure: Dict2
1: for each uj ∈ Vc do
2: if (ui ,uj ) ∈ E then
3: Dict2[uj ] ← Dict2[uj ] − Si, j
4: remove (ui ,uj ) from E
5: return Dict2
the nodes are deleted (line 10), which allows us to determine the
value of Rˆ that maximizes F . Line 6 determines which R are deleted
in each iteration. R is confirmed by {u ∈ V : w(u,G) ≤ w} (line 6),
where the averagew is given by:
w =
∑
u ∈V w(u,G)
|V|
=
2
∑
(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j +
∑
ui ∈V Si
|V| ≤ 2FG ,
(10)
because each edge Si, j is counted twice in ∑u ∈V w(u,G). In lines
7–14, the nodes in R are removed from Vc in each iteration (In
contrast, [11] recomputes all nodes and finds thosewith theminimal
w after deleting a node). As removing a subset of R may result in a
higher value of F , D-Spot records each change of F , as if the nodes
were removed one by one (lines 8–14). Algorithm 3 describes how
the edges are updated after a node is removed, requiring a total of
|E | updates. Finally, Algorithm 2 returns the subgraph Gˆ induced
by Rˆ, the set of nodes achieving Fmax , according to top and Dict1
(line 15).
Summary. As R contains at least one node, the worst-case time
complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(|V|2 + |E |). In practice, the worst
case is too pessimistic. In line 6, R usually contains plenty of nodes,
significantly reducing the number of scans ofVc (see Section 7.2).
6 ANALYSIS
6.1 Complexity.
In the graph initialization stage, it takesO(K |R| + |E|) time to build
G based on the optimization in Section 4.2. In D-Spot, the cost of
partitioning G is O(|E|), and detecting a dense block in a partition
G requiresO(|E |+ |V|2) operations, where |E | << |E|, |V| << |V|.
Thus, the complexity of ISG+D-Spot is linear with respect to |E|.
In the worst case, admittedly, |E| = |V|2 when there is some
dimension Ak in which |Rk | = 1. However, that is too pessimistic.
In the target fraud attacks, fraud groups typically exhibit strong
value sharing while legit entities should not. Hence, we expect G
to be sparse because the ui only have positive edges with a small
subset of V. We constructed a version of G using several real-world
datasets (see Fig. 3), and the edge densities were all less than 0.06.
6.2 Effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot
Theorem 6. (Spotting the Hidden-Densest Block). Given a dense
block B(A1, ...,AN ,X) in which the target dimensionU = AN and
V denotes the set of distinct values of AN , a shared value a exists
in B such that, ∀u ∈ V , ∃t ∈ B satisfying (t[U ] = u) ∧ (t[Ak ] = a).
Then, B must form a dense subgraph G in G.
Proof. Using the optimization algorithm in Section 4.2, we build
G by scanning all values in R once. Hence, the block B(a,Ak )must
be found. Let G = (V, E) be the subgraph induced by V in G.
Then, ∀(ui ,uj ) ∈ E, the edge Si, j ≥ Iki, j (a). Hence, ρedдe (G) = 1.0
and FG =
∑
∀(ui ,uj )∈E Si, j+
∑
ui ∈V Si
|V | ≥
|V |( |V |−1)Iki, j (a)
|V | = (|V| −
1)Iki, j (a). □
Observation. (Effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot) Consider a hidden-
densest block B(A1, ...,AN−1, AN ,X) of size |X| × ... × |X| × 1
and |B| = |X|, i.e., B is the densest on AN by sharing the value a.
Then, assuming the target dimension U = A1 and the fraudulent
entitiesV are distinct values of A1, ISG+D-Spot capturesV more
accurately than other algorithms based on tensors (denoted as Ten-
sor+Other Algorithms).
Proof. Let us consider a non-dense block Bˆ(Aˆ1, ..., AˆN ,X) of
size |X| × ... × |X|, |Bˆ | = |X|, and let Vˆ denote the distinct values
of Aˆ1. Denoting legitimate entities as Vˆ and fraudulent entities
as V , we now discuss the difference between ISG+D-Spot and
Tensor+Other Algorithms.
[Working on the tensor]. OnR, Bˆ is not dense and thus ρ(Bˆ, [N ]) = 1.
ForB, because {|B1 |, ..., |BN−1 |, |BN |} = {|X|, ..., |X|, 1}, we have
ρ(B, [N ]) = |B |1
N
∑
n∈[N ] |Bn | ≈ 1 for sufficiently large N .
[Working on ISG]. On G, let Gˆ denote the subgraph induced by
Vˆ and G denote the subgraph formed by V . We know that Gˆ,
FGˆ = 0, because Bˆ does not have any shared values. For G, FG =
(V − 1)Iki, j (a) according to Theorem 6.
[Other Algorithms]. M-Zoom[30] and D-Cube [32] are known to
find blocks that are at least 1/N of the optimum in term of ρ on R
( 1N -Approximation guarantee).
[D-Spot]. In Section 6.3, we will show that the subgraph detected
by D-Spot is at least 1/2 of the optimum in term of FG on ISG
( 12 -Approximation guarantee).
In summary, Tensor+Other Algorithms vs. ISG+D-Spot corresponds
to: (
ρ(Bˆ, [N ]) = 1 | ρ(B, [N ]) ≈ 1 + ( 1
N
-Approximation)
)
vs .
(
FGˆ = 0 | FG = (V − 1)Iki, j (a) + (
1
2 -Approximation)
)
Therefore, ISG+D-Spot catches fraudulent entities within hidden-
densest blocks more accurately than Tensor+Other Algorithms. □
From the observation, ISG+D-Spot can effectively detect hidden-
densest blocks. Similarly, when B becomes denser, the G formed
by B will also be much denser, and thus ISG+D-Spot will be more
accurate in detecting the densest block.
6.3 Accuracy Guarantee of D-Spot
For brevity, we use [V] to denote a subgraph induced by the set of
nodesV .
Theorem 7. (Algorithm 1 Guarantee). Given G = (V,E), let Gs
= {G1, ...,Gn } denote the connected components of G. Let F opti
denote the optimal F on Gi , i.e., ∄G′ ⊆ Gi satisfying FG′ > F opti .
Then, if F optn is the maximal value of {F opt1 , ..., F
opt
n }, F optn must
be the optimum in terms of F on G.
Proof. Given any two sets of nodesV1 andV2 and assuming
there are no edges connectingV1 andV2, we assume that F[V1] >
F[V2] ⇒ c1|V1 | >
c2
|V2 | ⇒ c1 |V2 | > c2 |V1 |. Then,
F[V1] − F[V1∪V2] ⇒
c1
|V1 | −
c1 + c2
|V1 | + |V2 |
⇒ c1 |V2 | − c2 |V1 ||V1 |(|V1 | + |V2 |) >
c2 |V1 | − c2 |V1 |
|V1 |(|V1 | + |V2 |) = 0.
Thus, for anyV1 andV2 that are not connected by any edges, it
follows that F[V1∪V2] ≤ max(F[V1],F[V2]) (Conclusion 1).
In Gn = (Vn , En ), we use Vˆ to denote the set of nodes satisfying
Vˆ ⊆ Vn and F[Vˆ] = F
opt
n . Let V ′ be a set of nodes satisfying
V ′ ⊂ V andV ′ ∩ Vˆ = ∅. Now, let us consider two conditions.
First, if V ′ ⊂ Vn , then F[V′] ≤ F[Vˆ] and F[V′∪Vˆ] ≤ F[Vˆ]
because F[Vˆ] is the optimum on Gn .
Second, ifV ′∩Vn = ∅, thenF[V′] ≤ F[Vˆ] andF[V′∪Vˆ] ≤ F[Vˆ]
by Conclusion 1 and because F[Vˆ] is the maximum of {F
opt
1 , ...,
F optn }.
IfV ′ ∩Vn , ∅, thenV ′ can be divided into two parts conform-
ing with the two conditions stated above.
Therefore, ∄V ′ ⊂ V satisfies F[V′] > F[Vˆ] or F[V′∪Vˆ] > F[Vˆ].
We can conclude that F optn = F[Vˆ] must be the optimum in terms
of F on G. □
Theorem 8. (Algorithm 2 Guarantee). Given a graph G = (V, E),
let Q∗ be a subset of nodes maximizing F[Q∗] in G. Let [Q] be the
subgraph returned by Algorithm 2 with F[Q ]. Then, F[Q ] ≥ 12F[Q∗].
Proof. Consider the optimal set Q∗. We know that, ∀u ∈ Q∗,
w(u, [Q∗]) ≥ F[Q∗], because if we remove a node u for which
w(u, [Q∗]) < F[Q∗],
F ′ = |Q
∗ |F[Q∗] −w(u,Q∗)
|Q∗ | − 1 >
|Q∗ |FQ∗ − FQ∗
|Q∗ | − 1 = F[Q∗],
which contradicts the definition of Q∗.
Denote the first node that Algorithm 2 removes from Q∗ as ui ,
ui ∈ R, and denote the node set before Algorithm 2 starts removing
R as Q ′. Because Q∗ ⊆ Q ′, we have w(ui , [Q∗]) ≤ w(ui , [Q ′]).
According to Algorithm 2 (line 6), w(ui , [Q ′]) ≤ 2F[Q ′] (Eq. 10).
Additionally, Algorithm 2 returns the best solution when deleting
nodes one by one, and so F[Q ] ≥ F[Q ′]. We conclude that
F[Q ] ≥ F[Q ′] ≥
w(ui , [Q ′])
2 ≥
w(ui , [Q∗])
2 ≥
FQ∗
2 .
□
In summary, let {G1, ...,Gn } be the subgraphs returned by D-
Spot, and {FG1 , ...,FGn } be the corresponding scores. Then, based
on Theorems 7 and 8, Fmax =max(FG1 , ...,FGn ) is at least 1/2 of
the optimum in terms of F on G (1/2-Approximation guarantee).
7 EVALUATION
A series of evaluation experiments were conducted under the fol-
lowing conditions:
Implementation. We implemented ISG+D-Spot in Python, and
conducted all experiments on a server with two 2.20 GHz Intel(R)
CPUs and 64 GB memory.
Baselines.We selected several state-of-the-art dense-block detec-
tion methods (M-Zoom [30], M-Biz [31], and D-Cube [32]) as the
baselines (using open source code). To obtain optimal performance,
we run three different density metrics from [32] for each baseline:
ρ (ari), Geometric Average Mass (geo), and Suspiciousness (sus).
Suspiciousness Score Setting. For the baselines, we considered
a detected block B(A1, ...,AN ,X) and let θ = ρ(B,N ). For any
unique value a within B, we then set the suspiciousness score of a
to θ . If a occurred in multiple detected dense blocks, we chose the
one with the maximal value of θ . Regarding ISG+D-Spot, given a
detected subgraph Gˆ = (Vˆ, Eˆ), for a unique value a ∈ Vˆ , we set the
suspiciousness score of a tow(a, Gˆ) (Eq. 9). Finally, we evaluated
the ranking of the suspiciousness scores of unique values using the
standard area under the ROC curve (AUC) metric.
7.1 Datasets
Table 3 summarizes the datasets used in the experiments.
Synthetic is a series of datasets we synthesized using the same
method as in [12]. First, we generated random seven-dimensional
relations R(A1, ...,A7,X ), in which |R| = 10000 and the size of R is
1000× 500× ...× 500. In R, we assume thatA1 corresponds to users
and the other six dimensions are features. To specifically check
the detection performance of the hidden-densest block using each
method, we injected a dense block B(A1, ...,A7,X) into R five sep-
arate times, with each injection assigned a different configuration
to generate five datasets. For B, |B1 | = 50 and |B| = 500. We in-
troduce the parameter λ, which denotes the number of dimensions
on which B is the densest. For example, when λ = 1, the size of
B is 50×12×25... × 25; when λ = 5, the size of B is 50×12×...×
12 ×25. Obviously, ρ(B, 7) > ρ(R, 7) and B is the hidden-densest
block when λ is small. Finally, we labeled the users within B as
“fraud”.
Amazon [15]. AmaOffice, AmaBaby, and AmaTools are three col-
lections of reviews about office products, baby-related products,
and tool products, respectively, on Amazon. They can be modeled
using the relation R(user ,product , timestamp,X ). For each entry
t ∈ R, t = (u,p, t ,x) indicates a review x that user u reviewed
product p at time t . According to the specific cases of fraud discov-
ered by previous studies [12, 38], fraudulent groups usually exhibit
suspicious synchronized behavior in social networks. For instance,
a large group of users may surprisingly review the same group of
products over a short period. Thus, we use a similar method as in
[12, 30, 32, 38]. We use a dense block B to represent the synchro-
nized behavior, where B(user ,product , timestamp,X) has a size
of 200 × 30 × 1. In total, we injected four such blocks B with a
mass randomly selected from [1000, 2000]. The users in the injected
blocks were labeled as “malicious.”
Yelp [25]. The YelpChi, YelpNYU, and YelpZip datasets [21, 25]
contain restaurant reviews submitted to Yelp. They can be rep-
resented by the relation R(user , restaurant ,date,X ), where each
entry t = (u, r ,d,x) denotes a review x by user u of restaurant r on
date d . Note that all three datasets include labels indicating whether
or not each review is fake. The detection of malicious reviews or
users is studied in [25] using text information. In these datasets,
we focus on detecting fraudulent restaurants that purchase fake
reviews using the three-dimensional features. Intuitively, the more
fake reviews a restaurant has, the more suspicious it is. As some
legitimate users have the potential of reviewing fraudulent restau-
rants, we label a restaurant as “fraudulent” if it has received more
than 40 fake reviews.
DARPA [19] was collected by the Cyber Systems and Technol-
ogy Group in 1998 regarding network attacks in TCP dumps. The
data has the form R(sourceIP , tarдetIP , timestamp,X ). Each entry
t = (IP1, IP2, t) represents a connection made from IP1 to IP2 at
time t . The dataset includes labels indicating whether or not each
connection is malicious. In practice, the punishment for malicious
connections is to block the corresponding IP address. Thus, we
compared the detection performance of suspicious IP addresses. We
labeled an IP address as suspicious if it was involved in a malicious
connection.
AirForce [1] was used for the KDD Cup 1999, and has also been
considered in [30, 32]. This dataset includes a wide variety of sim-
ulated intrusions in a military network environment. However, it
does not contain any specific IP addresses. According to the car-
dinality of each dimension, we chose the top-2 features and built
the relation R(src bytes,dst bytes, connections,X ), where src bytes
denotes the number of data bytes sent from source to destination
and dst bytes denotes the number of data bytes sent from destina-
tion to source. The target dimension U was set to be connections .
Note that this dataset includes labels indicating whether or not
each connection is malicious.
7.2 Speed and Accuracy of D-Spot
First, we measured the speed and accuracy with which D-Spot
detected dense subgraphs in real-world graphs. We compared the
Table 3: Multi-dimensional datasets used in our experiments
Synthetic TCP Dumps Review Data
DARPA AirForce YelpChi YelpNYU YelpZip AmaOffice AmaBaby AmaTools
Entries (Mass) 10K 4.6M 30K 67K 359K 1.14M 53K 160K 134K
Dimensions 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
performance of D-Spot with that of another dense-subgraph detec-
tion algorithm, Fraudar [11], the extension of [6], which maximizes
the density metric by greedily deleting nodes one by one. We used
the three Amazon datasets and applied D-Spot and Fraudar to the
same bipartite graph built on the first two dimensions, users and
products, where each edge in the graph represents an entry. We
measured the wall-clock time (average over three runs) required
to detect the top-4 subgraphs. Figure 2 illustrates the runtime and
performance of the two algorithms.
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Figure 2: Comparison of D-Spot and Fraudar using the Ama-
zon datasets.
D-Spot provides the best trade-off between speed and accuracy.
Specifically, D-Spot is up to 11× faster than Fraudar. This supports
our claim in Section 5.2 that the worst-case time complexity of
D-Spot (O(|V|2 + |E |)) is too pessimistic.
7.3 Effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot
This section illustrates the effectiveness of ISG+D-Spot for detect-
ing fraudulent entities on multi-dimensional tensors. ISG+D-Spot
exhibits extraordinary performance compared with the baseline
methods (Fraudar is not in the baselines as it only works on the
bipartite graph).
Synthetic. Table 4 presents the detection performance of each
method for the hidden-densest block. We assume that the injected
block B is the hidden-densest block when λ ≤ 3. In detail, ISG+D-
Spot achieves extraordinary performance even when λ = 1, because
each instance of value sharing in B is accurately captured by ISG
and D-Spot, providing a higher accuracy guarantee than the base-
lines (Theorems 2 and 3). When λ > 3, the performance of each
method improves because the density of B increases as λ increases.
Amazon. Table 5 presents the results for catching suspicious users
by detecting the top-4 dense blocks on the Amazon datasets. ISG+D-
Spot detects synchronized behavior accurately. The typical attack
scenario involves a mass of fraudulent users creating massive num-
bers of fake reviews for a comparatively small group of products
over a short period. This behavior is represented by the injected
blocks. ISG+D-Spot exhibits robust and near-perfect performance.
However, the other baselines produce worse performance on the
AmaOffice andAmaBaby datasets, evenwith themultiple supported
metrics.
Table 4: Performance (AUC) on the Synthetic datasets
λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3 λ = 4 λ = 5
M-Zoom (ari) 0.5005 0.5005 0.5000 0.5489 0.6567
M-Zoom (geo) 0.5005 0.5005 0.5000 0.6789 0.7543
M-Zoom (sus) 0.7404 0.7715 0.8238 0.9685 0.9767
M-Biz (ari) 0.5005 0.5005 0.5005 0.5005 0.6834
M-Biz (geo) 0.5005 0.5005 0.5005 0.6235 0.7230
M-Biz (sus) 0.6916 0.7638 0.8067 0.9844 0.9948
D-Cube (ari) 0.5005 0.5005 0.5005 0.5670 0.6432
D-Cube (geo) 0.5005 0.5005 0.5340 0.6876 0.6542
D-Cube (sus) 0.8279 0.8712 0.9148 0.9909 0.9725
ISG+D-Spot 0.9843 0.9957 0.9949 1.0000 1.0000
Table 5: Performance (AUC) on the Amazon datasets
AmaOffice AmaBaby AmaTools
M-Zoom (ari) 0.6795 0.5894 0.8689
M-Zoom (geo) 0.8049 0.8049 1.0000
M-Zoom (sus) 0.7553 0.6944 0.6503
M-Biz (ari) 0.6328 0.5461 0.8384
M-Biz (geo) 0.8049 0.8339 1.0000
M-Biz (sus) 0.7478 0.6944 0.6503
D-Cube (ari) 0.7127 0.5956 0.6250
D-Cube (geo) 0.8115 0.7561 1.0000
D-Cube (sus) 0.7412 0.6190 0.5907
ISG+D-Spot 0.8358 0.9995 1.0000
Yelp. Table 6 reports the (highest) accuracy with which collusive
restaurants were detected by each method. In summary, using
ISG+D-Spot results in the highest accuracy across all three datasets,
because D-Spot applies a higher theoretical bound to the ISG.
Table 6: Performance (AUC) on the Yelp datasets
YelpChi YelpNYU YelpZip
M-Zoom (ari) 0.9174 0.6669 0.8859
M-Zoom (geo) 0.9752 0.8826 0.9274
M-Zoom (sus) 0.9831 0.9451 0.9426
M-Biz (ari) 0.9174 0.6669 0.8863
M-Biz (geo) 0.9757 0.8826 0.9271
M-Biz (sus) 0.9831 0.9345 0.9403
D-Cube (ari) 0.5000 0.5000 0.9033
D-Cube (geo) 0.9793 0.9223 0.9376
D-Cube (sus) 0.9810 0.9007 0.9365
ISG+D-Spot 0.9875 0.9546 0.9529
DARPA. Table 7 lists the accuracy of each method for detecting
the source IP and the target IP. ISG+D-Spot assigns each IP address
a specific suspiciousness score. We chose a detected IP with the
highest score and found that the IP participated in more than 1M
malicious connections. The top ten suspicious IPs were all involved
in more than 10k malicious connections. Thus, using ISG+D-Spot
would enable us to crack down on these malicious IP addresses in
the real world.
Table 7: Performance (AUC) on the DARPA dataset
Dataset DARPA
U = source IP U = target IP
M-Zoom (ari) 0.5649 0.5584
M-Zoom (geo) 0.7086 0.5714
M-Zoom (sus) 0.6989 0.3878
M-Biz (ari) 0.5649 0.5584
M-Biz (geo) 0.7502 0.5679
M-Biz (sus) 0.6989 0.3878
D-Cube (ari) 0.3728 0.5323
D-Cube (geo) 0.4083 0.3926
D-Cube (sus) 0.4002 0.3720
ISG+D-Spot 0.7561 0.8181
AirForce. As this dataset does not contain IP addresses, we set the
target dimensionU = connections . We randomly sample 30k con-
nections from the dataset [1] three times. Table 8 lists the accuracy
of each method on samples 1–3. Malicious connections form dense
blocks on the two-dimensional features. The results demonstrate
that ISG+D-Spot effectively detected the densest blocks.
Table 8: Performance (AUC) on the AirForce dataset
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
M-Zoom (ari) 0.8696 0.8675 0.8644
M-Zoom (geo) 0.9693 0.9693 0.9738
M-Zoom (sus) 0.9684 0.9683 0.9726
M-Biz (ari) 0.9038 0.8848 0.8885
M-Biz (geo) 0.9694 0.9693 0.9741
M-Biz (sus) 0.9684 0.9683 0.9726
D-Cube (ari) 0.9824 0.9823 0.9851
D-Cube (geo) 0.9695 0.9691 0.9862
D-Cube (sus) 0.9697 0.9692 0.9737
ISG+D-Spot 0.9835 0.9824 0.9877
7.4 Scalability
As mentioned in Sec.6.1, the ISG Gs built using real-world tensors
are typically sparse, as value sharing should only conspicuously
appear in fraudulent entities. We implemented G on the three Ama-
zon datasets (details in Figure 3). The edge densities of G are quite
low (lower than 0.06) across all datasets, which indicates that the
worst-case time complexity discussed in Section 6.1 rarely occurs.
Figure 3 reports the runtime of ISG+D-Spot on the three Amazon
datasets, where the number of edges was varied by subsampling en-
tries in the dataset. In practice, |E| increases near-linearly with the
mass of the dataset. Additionally, because the time complexity of
ISG+D-Spot is linear with respect to |E|, ISG+D-Spot exhibits near-
linear scaling with the mass of the dataset. Figure 3 demonstrates
our conclusion.
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Figure 3: ISG+D-Spot runs in near-linear time with respect
to the mass of the dataset.
7.5 Feature Prioritization
This section is to demonstrate that ISG+D-Spot is more robust to
resist noisy features than existing approaches. ISG automatically
weighs each feature and continuously accumulates value sharing
by one scan of the tensor, and D-Spot amounts to finds entities
with the maximum of value sharing. We conducted the following
experiment to demonstrate our conclusion.
Registration is a dataset derived from an e-commerce company,
in which each record contains two crucial features, IP subnet and
phone prefix, and three noisy features, IP city, phone city, and
timestamp. The dataset also includes labels showing whether or
not the account is a “zombie” account. Thus, it can be formulated as
R(accounts, IP, phone, IP city, phone city, timestamp,X ). To compare
the detection performance of malicious accounts, we applied each
method on various R by successively appending 1–5 features to
R(accounts,X ).
Table 9: Performance (AUC) on the Registration dataset. ‘C’
represents ‘crucial feature’ and ‘N’ represents ‘noisy feature’
1C 2C 2C+1N 2C+2N 2C+3N
M-Zoom (ari) 0.5000 0.5000 0.5031 0.5000 0.5430
M-Zoom (geo) 0.7676 0.8880 0.8827 0.8744 0.8439
M-Zoom (sus) 0.7466 0.8328 0.4009 0.4878 0.4874
M-Biz (ari) 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5004
M-Biz (geo) 0.7677 0.8842 0.8827 0.8744 0.8439
M-Biz (sus) 0.7466 0.8328 0.4009 0.4878 0.4874
D-Cube (ari) 0.7073 0.8189 0.8213 0.8295 0.7987
D-Cube (geo) 0.7073 0.9201 0.8586 0.8312 0.7324
D-Cube (sus) 0.7522 0.8956 0.7877 0.7642 0.7080
ISG+D-Spot 0.7699 0.9946 0.9935 0.9917 0.9859
Table 9 gives the variation of each method with regard to the
added noisy features (3– 5 dimensions). As each account only pos-
sesses one entry, R is quite sparse. We found that existing methods
usually miss small-scale instances of value sharing because their
density is close to the legitimate range on R. For example, a 51-
member group sharing a single IP subnet was missed by the baseline
methods. However, ISG amplifies each instance of value sharing
through its information-theoretic and graph features, allowing D-
Spot to accurately capture fraudulent entities.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we novelly identified dense-block detection with
dense-subgraph mining, by modeling a tensor in ISG. Additionally,
we propose a multiple dense-subgraphs detection algorithm that
is faster and can be computed in parallel. In future, ISG + D-Spot
will be implemented on Apache Spark [39] to support very large
tensors.
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